Thinking globally 184 Comparative law research 185 International regulation 186 This book was published by a multinational company with offices or representative offices in several countries with the aim of reaching a potential international readership. Theoretically, courses in sociology of law, social law or law and society could be taught at any university in the world. In practice, the largest markets for books of this type are the United Kingdom and the United States – English-speaking countries that have developed university systems. They also have long-established democracies and a tradition in civil society of reflection and debate on social issues that has spawned academic topics such as sociology, social policy, and political science. The largest and most theoretically developed research literature on law and society has been produced in industrialized countries. It was natural to use examples from these countries rather than Africa, Latin America, India, the Pacific Islands, China or Japan. This is simply because many of the best-equipped and theoretically well-developed studies come from American legal and social researchers. However, since it deliberately does not contain many details about certain legal systems, this book may be too international for their taste for some readers. The scientific publication seems to show that very few textbooks sell well outside a national readership.
If this is true, to what extent can we really say that we live in a globalized world? The scientific project of global legal pluralism seems to contain a mystery at its core. How can a legal theory be oriented towards pluralism and multiplicity while claiming to be a “global” theory? This conundrum explains the criticism that global legal pluralism receives from committed pluralists, on the one hand, and committed triumphalists of international law, on the other. Pluralists argue that the normative aspect of global legal pluralism essentially summarizes by focusing on procedures and institutions that foster dialogue and interaction. The problem of legal pluralism 168 Aboriginal, Community and State Law 169 Weak and Strong Versions 171 Pluralism and the classical tradition 172 Second, and in relation to the objection of international law, Lindahl proposes what he calls the IACA model of law, which he defines as “institutionalized and authoritative collective action.” This broad definition of law reflects the fundamental idea of legal pluralism: not everything that is just or similar to law comes from formal and state sources. Lindahl`s approach makes it possible to talk about emerging global legal systems, whether from above or below. But because it is a descriptive account based on empirical facts on the ground, it deprives formal international law of its own asserted superior position. In fact, it is, in a way, a logical consequence of the fact that there is no legal order that includes without exclusion. There will always be those who resist: those who feel excluded from a legal order or those who refuse to be included in that order. These resisters may well create their own emerging legal system.
And from the point of view of these resisters, the so-called global legal order that aims to include them can be considered illegitimate. Therefore, pluralism recognizes as a fundamental issue that there is no way to stay out of the world and declares from an Archimedean point of view that some laws are universally legitimate and others are not. On the contrary, the legitimacy or lack of legitimacy of the law is always a political argument and a point of sociological discord. Box 8.1 The Cheyenne Way 170 8.2 Towards a new legal meaning 174 8.3 The three failures of globalization 177 8.4 Conducting a global study 185 First, and in relation to the pluralistic objection, Lindahl notes that there is no way to conceptualize a normative legal order, even if it is the most inclusive, that does not exclude or include in one way or another: Because there will always be those who will resist and refuse to recognize this order. Therefore, according to Lindahl, it is impossible to offer a normative representation of the law, however respectful of pluralism, that will not effectively eliminate some pluralism by creating boundaries between what is included and what is excluded. Lindahl`s discussion makes clear that even a supposedly pluralistic approach that rejects a globally uniform set of rules can nevertheless be a fundamentally universalist approach that is indelible and inevitably always in tension with pluralism itself. Indeed, there can be no way out of this conundrum if one wants to postulate some sort of normative account of how law or legal institutions should be conceptualized. So what to do in response to these two opposing criticisms, both of which are true? My answer is to recognize the mystery and therefore to always be aware of its claims of legitimacy or legality or the exercise of hegemonic power. This does not mean that such claims should never be made; Only that one should be aware of the mysteries that inevitably make such claims problematic.
This is what Lindahl calls “restricted collective assertiveness,” and it is probably the most compelling way to understand how authority works in a world where authority is always relative, not absolute. The answer to the objections of pluralists and triumphalists is therefore fundamentally pragmatic. The concerns of both groups are correct, but there is no way to completely get rid of these concerns. Any decision of institutional design or choice of procedure or judicial or legislative rule will always and necessarily be “legally pathetic”, as Robert Cover would say, favouring one law over another and striking a blow to pluralism. At the same time, any honest descriptive representation of law must recognize that, in the face of any assertion of law, even the most comprehensive and comprehensive pluralism will never be defeated; What is legitimate for My answer may simply be to plead “guilty” on both counts. But of course, there is more to it than that, and so in this essay I play these arguments and answers in more detail, using Hans Lindahl`s sprawling and provocative work on global legal pluralism, authority, and the globalization of inclusion and exclusion as a starting point. In particular, I will draw on two arguments that are at the heart of Lindahl`s work. a universalist liberal legality and is therefore not fundamentally pluralistic at all.
Triumphalists, on the other hand, fear that the descriptive representation of law offered by global legal pluralism undermines the hard-won norms and institutions of international law, or deprives those norms and institutions of their distinct authority as hierarchically superior law. Globalization and the law 173 Debates on globalization 175 The field of international arbitration 178 The global law firm 180 Implementation of human rights 182 Can global legal pluralism be both “global” and “pluralistic”? .